Fidesz Fragmented Under Pressure: Strategy or Disunity?
Are Fidesz's public squabbles and contradictions signs of genuine disunity—or a conscious strategy? Even if it is the latter, how effective can it be? -asks Hanna Fölsz
Fidesz’s communication over the past few weeks has been unusually fragmented, with leading Fidesz politicians and businessmen contradicting each other and publicly clashing. For a party long known for ironclad internal unity, we are now seeing something very different: infighting and visible cracks within Fidesz. Are these public squabbles and contradictions signs of genuine disunity—or a conscious strategy? Even if it is the latter, how effective can it be?
For the first time since 2010, it looks like Fidesz could lose the next national election. As Alex Faludy pointed out in his article a few days ago, Fidesz is more afraid of losing now than it was in 2022 (he insightfully explains why). We now see Fidesz reacting under real threat and trying its hardest to retain or regain public support.
Within this context, one of the most striking developments has been the appearance of internal criticism—rare in a party that typically punishes even mild deviation from the party line.
This month, János Lázár, Construction and Transport Minister and long-time prominent Fidesz figure, openly criticized Lőrinc Mészáros, Orbán’s chief oligarch and Hungary’s richest man, calling out his extravagant lifestyle—including private jet travel valued at 22 billion forints. In turn, Tibor Navracsics, Minister for Regional Development and a representative of Fidesz’s ‘moderate’ wing, took a swipe at Lázár for holding shares in a company that owns a hunting estate in Batida.
Mészáros also chimed in. This week, in a long, unusually well-written open letter, he defended his fortune and his working-class background, claiming he became a billionaire before Fidesz’s rise and sees no reason to be ashamed of success. He contrasted his own trajectory with that of Péter Magyar, whom he painted as a privileged figure frustrated by failed attempts to join Hungary’s elite, including an alleged rejected job application to one of Mészáros’s own firms. In short, Mészáros cast Magyar’s political turn as bitterness rather than principle.
Meanwhile, the Fidesz government has made uncharacteristic admissions of failure, both in terms of governance and corruption. One example is a scheme to compensate travellers for MÁV (Hungarian National Rail System) train delays, first announced by Lázár in January. The policy - refunds of 50% after 20 minutes of delay - has now gone into effect, with huge payouts of compensation. A number of lower-level instances of corruption have also been prosecuted in recent weeks.
Is this a central Fidesz strategy or real disunity and defections? Given Fidesz’s centralized control, the more likely explanation is a controlled performance: a “reform communist”-style move to convince voters that Fidesz can purge bad apples itself, without the need for government change. As Lázár recently put it:
“Those members of the NER* who latched onto us like ticks and abused the opportunities that were created—the time has truly come to shake them off, so that we can maintain the trust of those who vote for us.”
The message is clear: there are “good” and “bad” parts of the system, and Fidesz will clean house. It’s an attempt to restore credibility without changing the structure of power. For this strategy, Fidesz has turned to its more independent and moderate wing. Lázár works well for this role: he has ample charisma and a history of more independent moves, part of a past (failed) attempt to become Orbán’s genuine rival. Navracsics has often been the voice of “moderation” and has steered clear of Fidesz’s culture of self-enrichment himself (while, of course, not raising concerns about others’ corruption). He can therefore speak somewhat more credibly about the excesses of Fidesz oligarchs and politicians.
Still, it’s a delicate balancing act and it is arguably not working very well. Too much emphasis on corruption or mismanagement may backfire—either by lending credibility to opposition narratives or by confusing loyal voters unsure of what Fidesz now stands for. The MÁV compensation policy, for instance, has not been a PR win. Voters are also more outraged by corruption than before as they themselves struggle to afford their usual lifestyle amidst the current economic downturn. It only underscores the scale of dysfunction and lack of integrity.
Authoritarian regimes under threat often experience growing fractures within the ruling party and its elite. Elites begin hedging their bets, focusing on their own survival. Still, in Hungary, Tisza’s message has been explicitly anti-deal-making, raising the perceived risks of a Tisza win for those who have benefited most under Fidesz while offering little prospect for escaping punishment. This means the benefits of defection from Fidesz, particularly for those who enriched themselves or are high-profile figures, are limited. The best guarantee of survival is still within Fidesz -- for now.
Hanna Fölsz
* NER = Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere (System of National Co-Operation), Fidesz’s own term for the regime it has created.